Giacomo Turbanti
Università di Pisa, Italy | turbanti.giacomo@gmail.com
Received: 30-April-2018 | Accepted: 15-August-2018 | Published: 30-June-2019
Disputatio [Jun. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 9, pp. 00-00 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3247931
Article | [EN] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 8 No. 9
How to cite this article:
Turbanti, Giacomo (2019). «Rationality and the variety of language games». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 9: pp. 00-00.
Abstract | One of the most striking clashes between the results of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reflections on language games and Robert Brandom’s normative analysis of pragmatics concerns the pride of place granted by the latter to assertional practices. While Wittgenstein believes that there is no privileged language game, Brandom maintains that the game of giving and asking for reasons is fundamental for the possibility of any linguistic practice to be properly meaningful. Recently, Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance proposed to generalize Brandom’s normative pragmatics in order to provide a more fine–grained analysis of the normativity that governs discursive practices. It is a courageous enterprise that challenges the predominance of the cognitive approach in pragmatics by underpinning a different way to understand the notion of meaning. Their proposal, however, requires to take into account many different sorts of speech acts on a par and, by doing so, it is in tension with Brandom’s approach. This paper explores the shape of this tension in order to see whether or not a unitary characterization of rationality can be envisaged in Wittgenstein’s and Brandom’s way of accounting for the ability to deploy conceptual contents in linguistic practices.
Keywords | Normative Pragmatics · Declarative Fallacy · Discursive Rationality · Language Games · Space of Reason.
La racionalidad y la variedad de los juegos de lenguaje
Resumen | Uno de los choques más impactantes entre los resultados de las reflexiones de Ludwig Wittgenstein acerca de los juegos de lenguaje y el análisis normativo de la pragmática de Robert Brandom se relaciona con la importancia asignada por éste a las prácticas de afirmación. Mientras que Wittgenstein cree que no haya ningún juego de lenguaje privilegiado, Brandom mantiene que el juego de dar y pedir razones es fundamental para la posiblidad de que cualquier práctica lingüística sea apropiadamente significativa. Recientemente, Rebecca Kukla y Mark Lance propusieron generalizar la pragmática normativa de Brandom para ofrecer un análisis más diferenciado de la normatividad que gobierna las prácticas discursivas. Se trata de una empresa valiente que reta el predominio del acercamiento cognitivo en pragmática, dando soporte a una manera diferente de entender la noción de significado. Su planteamiento requiere, sin embargo, que se tomen en cuenta a la par muchos diferentes tipos de actos de habla y de esta manera genera tensión con el planteamiento de Brandom. Este trabajo explora el contorno de esta tensión para averiguar si se puede o no visualizar una caracterización unitaria de la racionalidad a la manera en que Wittgenstein y Brandom dan cuenta de la capacidad de aplicar contenidos conceptuales en las prácticas lingüísticas.
Palabras Clave | Práctica discursiva · Inferencialismo · Juegos de Lenguaje · Pluralismo · Seguir una Regla.
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