Manuel de Pinedo
Universidad de Granada, Spain | manueldepinedo@gmail.com
Received: 27-September-2018 | Accepted: 12-January-2019 | Published: 30-June-2019
Disputatio [Jun. 2019], Vol. 8, No. 9, pp. 00-00 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3236912
Article | [SP] | Full Text | Statistics | Copyright Notice [es] | Vol. 8 No. 9
How to cite this article:
Pinedo, Manuel (2019). «Two Forms of Quietism: What can be Spoken About in Philosophy?». Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 8, no. 9: pp. 00–00.
Abstract | In this paper I explore two possible ways of being quietist in philosophy and relate them to the work of Wittgenstein and McDowell. On the one hand, quietism could be understood as an imperative to remain quiet regarding what we value the most. The final aphorisms of the Tractatus seem to gesture in this direction. On the other hand, it could be seen as a refusal to produce philosophical theories regarding general and abstract issues such as meaning or thought. McDowell has recommended reading the Investigations under this light and has followed the advice in most of his work. I discuss some consequences of this approach to issues such as rule following, mental externalism and ethical particularlism and try to show that there is much exciting philosophical work to be done even after abandoning grand theoretical aspirations.
Keywords | Wittgenstein · John McDowell · Particularism · Rule Following · Externalism.
Dos formas de quietismo: ¿De qué se puede hablar en filosofía?
Resumen | En este trabajo exploro dos formas de ser quietista en filosofía y las relaciono con la filosofía de Wittgenstein y McDowell. En un primer sentido, el quietismo podría entenderse como la obligación de permanecer silencioso con respecto a las cuestiones que más valoramos. Los aforismos finales del Tractatus parecen apuntar en esta dirección. El segundo sentido es una negativa a producir teorías filosóficas con respecto a cuestiones generales y abstractas como el significado o el pensamiento. McDowell ha presentado una lectura en esta última línea de las Investigaciones y ha seguido esta dirección en la mayoría de su propia filosofía. Discuto algunas consecuencias de este segundo enfoque para el seguimiento de reglas, el externismo sobre lo mental y el particularismo ético e intento mostrar que hay muchas posibilidades de realizar investigación filosófica de importancia incluso tras el abandono de las grandes pretensiones teóricas.
Palabras Clave | Wittgenstein · McDowell · Particularismo · Seguimiento de Reglas · Externismo.
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